ABSTRACT Despite the excellent classification performance, recent research has revealed that the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) could be readily deceived by only the small adversarial perturbation. Its imperceptible to human eyes and transferability from one model to another actually threaten the security of a CNN-based system. In this paper, we propose to create multiple and independent random binary codes per input class and train ensemble of homogeneous CNN classifiers with these codes to improve the adversarial robustness of the networks. The proposed ensemble structure consists of replicas of the same learning architecture, but each network is trained with different random target outputs. The network model is simultaneously trained with their own unique binary codes, and optimized through a single and common objective function in an end-to-end manner. It is demonstrated with experimental results that assigning different encoded labels for each classifier in ensemble leverages the diversity and eventually improves the classification performance on adversarial attacks. We also conduct several performance analysis to understand how the different aspects can contribute to the robustness of the proposed algorithm. The proposed algorithm provides significantly improved classification accuracies as compared to the recent relevant studies, verified with various network architectures, datasets, and adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) has been extensively employed in computer vision problems including image classification due to its proven effectiveness [1] . However, recent studies show that the CNNs can still be fooled by adversarial examples that are maliciously designed to deceive the network in spite of high performance with clean examples. While an adversarial attack can be made by adding only the small perturbations to the input [2] , [3] , it can have a significant impact to the performance of a CNN. Furthermore, its indiscernibleness to human eyes and transferability from one model to another actually threaten the security of a CNN-based system [4] - [6] . Therefore, enhancement of the adversarial robustness has been emerged as a important consideration for the development of CNN algorithms.
Prior studies reach an agreement that the adversarial examples are misclassified due to high dimensionality of input images and the internal elements of modern network
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Senthil Kumar. models such as a cross-entropy loss, one-hot coding scheme, etc [7] , [8] . This idea significantly shaped the direction of defense techniques for adversarial attack in recent years [9] , [10] . Prior research has corroborated that eliminating high dimensional features from the input data increases the robustness of neural networks [11] . There also have been diverse approaches to complement decision boundaries of the CNNs such as adding adversarial examples into the training data, employing multiple models for an ensemble, and etc [12] - [14] .
Other major approaches to handle the adversarial examples make attackers difficult to choose the harmful gradient direction. To achieve this goal, some preliminary works transform the output encodings of CNNs by increasing its dimension or randomizing target representations [7] , [8] .
In addition, implementing randomness in a model also makes the model unpredictable for the attackers and restrains transferability of the attack [15] . These techniques have a capability to veil the relation between gradient of loss and the decision boundaries making the entity of models tenable to the potential attacks. In this paper, we propose a random binary ensemble model that exploits multiple binary encoded labels to improve adversarial robustness of CNN to white-box attack models. We employ the random target encoding instead of traditional one-hot encoding method to represent the input class. Subsequently, the duplicates of the same CNN architectures are simultaneously trained with their own unique binary codes creating an ensemble yet optimized through a single objective function. The disparate binary codes assigned for an input can result in different weights for each classifier. On the other hand, the classifiers also interact with others as they are trained with the same objective function. The conceptual explanation of the robustness in our algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The random binary encoding method involves more complexity owing to its multiple high bits compared to a simple one-hot code, and therefore it makes an attacker not readily predict the gradient. For instance, an adversarial perturbation e i can be critical when being predicted as f (x) + e o . However, in a higher dimension, an attacker cannot carry out the critical attack because of many possible numbers among f (x) + e o . In other words, the randomness mitigates the problem by diversifying the directions. Moreover, fallacious decision boundaries can be adjusted by the advantage of ensemble diversity making our algorithm robust to adversarial perturbations as shown in the overlapped section between the circles in Fig.1 .
The main contributions are as follows. We discover that providing random binary codebooks for each ensemble model is sufficient to promote diversity despite using a single CNN architecture as an ensemble classifier. With this powerful combination, we also examine that it is unnecessary to include adversarial examples in the training dataset as in most of the other defenses [12] , [16] , [17] . Neither, the classification accuracy on clean examples does not need to be sacrificed for the sake of the accuracy on adversarial examples as reported on several previous papers [18] , [19] . We further examine the robustness of our algorithm under limited size of dataset, which poses significance considering the difficulty of obtaining data in the real world. This high steadiness regardless of small dataset is considered to stem from different random binary codes assigned for an input data in the ensemble resulting in the effect of data augmentation. This paper is divided into five sections. Sec. II reviews related works. In Sec. III, we outline the proposed technique. Experiments are carried out in Sec. IV. The conclusion is drawn in Sec. V.
II. RELATED WORKS
CNN is trained using the gradient descent optimization to iteratively update and learn weights from input data [1] . Through many years, the CNN has formed a basic stacked structure of linear and nonlinear layers including convolutional layer, pooling layer, fully connected layer, and activation function. This architecture raises the performance on a complicated large scale ImageNet dataset up-to-date [20] - [22] .
In classification tasks, the output of CNN is followed by a softmax activation function since a target output that is also referred to as label is generally encoded into an one-hot code. One-hot code is widely used for addressing multi-class classification due to the simplicity. However, it is vulnerable to adversarial attacks when the output space becomes larger with fine-grained classification tasks [12] , [16] , [23] . Nevertheless, there has been a few studies that attempt to replace the conventional one-hot codes. Deng et al. [24] compare seven encoding methods and report that sum and backward difference coding shows the highest accuracy. For the target detection and recognition problem, Deng et al. [26] and Rodríguez [27] proposed an error-correcting output coding and applied it to optical character recognition (OCR). The advantage is corroborated by Potdar et al. [23] as they demonstrate its faster convergence speed with lower dimensional embedded space.
Despite its success, recent findings raised concerns about the validity of these CNN in terms of security. Goodfellow et al. [27] discovered that the optimization of CNN through a gradient descent algorithm can be misused to deceive the neural network. They introduced a single-step attack called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), which simply adds perturbation pixels to the original clean example in the direction of gradient increment to make neural networks misclassify. This gradient-based attack develops into more powerful iterative attacks such as Projected Gradient Method (PGD) [28] and Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) [29] . Based on the accessibility of attackers, these attacks are divided into two types: a white-box attack and a black-box attack. The white-box attack is obtained with the full knowledge of the model including its structure and parameters. On the contrary, in the black-box attack, none of information about the model is given when the perturbations are generated. In this case, attackers attempt to yield perturbations relying on substituted models and transfer them to the original model. In addition, the perturbations can be generated to classify an image as a specified target label or any incorrect label, which are respectively named a targeted attack and an untargeted attack. Our algorithm focuss on white-box and untargeted attacks. We show several defense strategies against the adversarial attacks in sequel.
A. ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Various approaches have been proposed to protect the network from adversarial attacks [10] . One of the major defenses to malicious input is adversarial training. Adversarial training takes both clean and adversarial examples into account during training to increase the resistance to adversarial attacks. Goodfellow et al. [27] presented a pragmatic adversarial training scheme by suggesting a simple and fast method to generate adversarial examples. They also emphasize that the adversarial training acts as a solid regularizer in excess of dropout [30] . Kurakin et al. [31] further extended this training method to deeper models and larger datesets such as Inception v3 [32] and ImageNet [33] , respectively. Subsequently, there have been many attempts to analyze this training strategy with others such as autoencoder, ensemble, and etc [16] , [34] . However, this method might still suffer from iterative attacks (e.g. PGD, MIM, and etc) [31] and sensitivity on the strength of an attack. Besides, adversarial training does not perform well when a different type of an attack with those included in a training set is applied [31] , [35] .
B. ENSEMBLE TRAINING
Ensemble methods has been widely used for classification tasks due to the generalization capability [36] , [37] . Thus, there is no wonder why the researchers pay attention to the ensemble methods to the adversarial problems. Strauss et al. [38] investigated the effect of ensemble as a sole defense method by alternating ensemble parameters such as random initial weights, multiple classifiers, bagging, and Gaussian-noise insertion. The ensemble mechanism is further incooperated with adversarial training by Tramèr et al. [19] . In order to hinder influence of attacks transferring across different models, they augment the training data by transferring data perturbed in other models. Then, Liao [39] use the transfer method for simultaneous adversarial training, where a network is able to learn from adversarial examples of other networks, simultaneously.
The level of diversity of classifiers in ensemble has a significant impact on its performance. Thus, there are several studies to boost the diversity in ensemble as well. Pang et al. [40] presents an adaptive promoting regularizer (ADP) to encourage diversity among non-maximal predictions of individual classifiers. Inspired by determinant point process [41] , they facilitate the diversity by maximizing the entropy across the ensemble. Kariyappa and Qureshi [42] provide an insight to train an ensemble model with uncorrelated loss function for the adversarial robustness. In their work, a regularization term called Gradient Alignment Loss is proposed to measure the overlapping subspace of adversarial examples and minimize its coherence.
C. OUTPUT ENCODING
There have been a few studies attempting to modify output encoding of neural networks to gain resistance to adversarial attacks. In the beginning, the effect of output encoding (also called target encoding) has been studied with clean examples. The error-correcting output codes (ECOC) were proposed to improve the classification performance and convergence speed in conventional image recognition problems such as OCR [23] , [25] , [26] . Current approaches based on the ECOC technique leverage the effective defense against adversarial attack. In [7] , Kim et al. suggest to implement multi-way encoding instead of conventional one-hot encoding to reduce the correlation of gradients between layers and models. They show a higher dimensional encoding space significantly help reducing the degree of gradient perturbations and alleviated the vulnerability of the model. Furthermore, Saito and Roy [8] demonstrated with experiments that randomized target representation in uniform distribution and mean-squared error (MSE) in replacement of the conventional cross-entropy loss can greatly impact the adversarial robustness of neural networks.
Our algorithm is inspired by the works aforementioned above. However, as compared to the previous works, we fully investigate the classification performance of ensemble of CNNs incorporating random binary encoding. Specifically, the proposed algorithm aims to achieve two goals, i.e., improvements of distinguishing power by prospering diversity in ensemble with random binary encoding and consequent reinforcements of the robustness of CNN.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM A. RANDOM TARGET ENCODING
Conventional one hot coding uses a matrix Y ∈ R N ×N = [y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N −1 ], where a column vector y i is used for encoding the i-th label in N classes. The dimension of the encoding vector is the same as the number of classes. The i-th element is set to one in y i to represent a categorical index while all the other elements are set to 0. Our random binary encoding increases the dimension of the output vector to K in order to enhance the adversarial robustness. We define the binary encoding matrix T to transform Y to our codebook
. The i-th column vector b i ∈ R K represents the i-th categorical label in the output space instead of y i .
A codeword b i , i = 0..N − 1 is iteratively created and written in a codebook one by one, using random generation. The j-th element of the output vector is generated using Bernoulli distribution with the probability p = 0.5. In other words, P(b i (j) = 1) = P(b i (j) = −1) = 0.5. In the output of the CNN, we use a tangent hyperbolic (tanh) activation function instead of a sigmoid function because the slope of the tanh function makes it easier to find the confidence score during testing. Thus, b i (j) is determined as either -1 or 1 to be suitable with an interval of the tanh function.
The elements are randomly generated, but during the generation, the codes are chosen with the considerations of Hamming distance as follows. First, it is examined if a generated codeword keeps the minimum Hamming distance H min between the other random binary codes in a code book.
The condition guarantees the least distance between the codes to provide reliable classification performance. If the two codewords have only small distance from each other by chance, they have more probabilities to be confused by one another. Thus, a codeword is replaced in the codebook to keep the distance. In our work, H min is empirically determined as,
where · is a ceiling function. Second, a codeword is screened if having the maximum Hamming distance H max between two codewords in the codebook. This implies that the flipped version of a codeword already exists in the codebook, and, thus the correlated patterns can degrade the coding performance. Therefore, in the generation, the complementary codeword is eliminated and replaced with a new codeword to avoid the correlation. The code length K can be altered freely. However, in our algorithm, we determine K to consider the both representation capability and the minimum Hamming distance. That is, we first compute the number of bits to represent the total number of possible codewords and their flipping in N classes as log 2 N + 1, and add H min bits to guarantee the minimum distance. In sum, we have the minimum code length K min , given as
As H min is determined as log 2 N in Eq.1, the minimum code length is calculated as 2 × log 2 N + 1. From an experiment in our previous paper [43] , the performance of the classification model is not significantly affected as long as the code length is sufficiently greater than the minimum. Therefore, we increase the code length K to 64 in our experiments, when N is 10. We also show the variations of the classification performance when having different code lengths in Section IV. The random vector generation is recursively applied for the codebook to contain all the distinguished binary vectors satisfying the conditions. Once the generation of the codebook is completed, the target output is used for training an individual CNN.
B. RANDOM ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER
Ensemble random classifier is developed to enhance the adversarial robustness of the CNN. Our intuition is that a classifier is less likely fooled by an adversarial example when the training procedure is diversified [19] , [38] , [40] . Following this idea, we use multiple CNNs with the same learning architecture but with different random target outputs. Fig. 2 shows the architecture of the proposed model, comprising the multiple columns of individual CNNs.
In each classifier of the ensemble, the target output b i is randomly generated, and it is independently assigned to each classifier. The multiform labeling contributes to the deviation in model weights, and, accordingly it shapes the replicate models into various classifiers. The dynamic power of random binary codes is demonstrated in an experiment of Section IV. Algorithm 1 shows the process to generate binary codebooks for classifiers in ensemble. while i = N do 6: Choose b j from B m , ∀j = i, 7: if H (b i , b j ) < H min or equal to H max then 8: Generate b temp
Algorithm 1 Generating Binary Codebooks for Classifiers in Ensemble

9:
Replace b j with b temp 10: else 11: i ← i + 1 12: Append B m to B
C. TRAINING
We use a loss function L m for the m-th classifier in Fig. 2 as follows:
where T is the total number of training samples, b is the ground-truth that is generated in the m-th CNN, and o j is the outcome of the CNN for the j-th training instance. For the loss function, we use the mean square error (MSE) because a typical cross-entropy loss is inefficient to manage binary encoded labels in adversarial attacks [7] . During the training, the replicas of the CNNs in an ensemble are simultaneously trained, where the same batch input is used for all the CNNs per weight update at the same time [37] .
In other words, all the losses of the individual classifiers are computed with the same input batch, and they are summed up to establish a single objective function L ENS . Mathematically, the loss function is given as:
where an ensemble entropy (EE) is added to promote ensemble diversity [40] . The EE term is calculated as follows:
where P i is the probability of classification result predicted as class i in N classes, and 10 −20 is an offset. Minimizing L ENS leads to the maximization of the negative entropy term. Thus, Eq.(4) allows the ensemble model to improve the ability to distinguish ambiguous samples by increasing the diversity of classifiers. Furthermore, because all the collective losses are considered during backpropagation, it enables interaction between the classifiers. The optimization is conducted with Adam optimizer during the backpropagation.
D. TESTING WITH ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In testing, we use white-box attacks as reviewed in Sec. II, assuming that all the knowledge about the training datasets and the classifier including target network models and their model parameters is known. Specifically, the adversarial examples are created from the test set in a direction to maximize the gradient of the objective function in Eq.4. Then, the white-box attacking perturbations are summed up to the original examples to test the robustness of our algorithm under adversarial condition. We train the CNN classifiers with clean examples. Then the clean inputs are transformed into malicious inputs.
The result for each classifier is determined based on the proximity between the target output and the outcome of the CNN. Given with an adversarial input x, the outcome of a classifier o goes through tanh activation layer to embed the CNN output range to the target binary codes. Then, we find the predicted binary code in B m , by choosing the nearest distance to the activated output. The classification index i * is given by measuring the Euclidean distance: Once the classification results are collected in ensemble from all the CNNs, the final prediction is determined using Maximum-A-Posteriori (MAP). That is, the estimator is defined as:
where x is an input, y m k is the output from the m-th classifier, and Y is the possible set of output codes. For a major voting, the posterior probability can be changed to the indicator function I, given as y * = arg max
where F is the network.
IV. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we show experimental results to demonstrate the robustness of the proposed algorithm to white-box adversarial attacks, including FGSM [27] , PGD [28] , and MIM [29] attacks, for classification tasks. We also conduct several ablation tests to analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm. Specifically, we examine the performance by changing a size of ensemble, a length of codewords, and the use of random binary codes. We also test the reliability with limited number of data in supervision under attacks.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
We present results on various benchmark datasets such as MNIST [44] , Fashion-MNIST [45] , and CIFAR−10 [46] datasets. The MNIST dataset consists of handwritten digits from 0 to 9, and it contains 60, 000 images for the training set and 10, 000 images for the test set. The sample image is with the size of 28 × 28. The Fashion-MNIST dataset has the same size and the same number of classes as types of clothing. The CIFAR−10 dataset includes 32 × 32 color images with 10 categories. It has 50, 000 training images and 10, 000 test images. The training images are augmented for CIFAR-10 by random flips and cropping. The pixel values are normalized to be between 0 and 1. Different CNN architectures are used to show effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. ResNet [47] , WideResNet [48] , and DenseNet [22] are used as base network models for Fashion MNIST, CIFAR-10, and MNIST, respectively. Most of learning parameters such as learning rates, the number of epochs, and other optimization parameters are used as the same values as the original network models.
To test the robustness under adversarial attacks, we first train the CNN classifiers with clean examples and create the adversarial examples from the test set. Adversarial perturbations are generated, using the maximum size of the perturbation . We set to 0.05 and 0.1 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets and 0.07 and 0.15 for CIFAR-10. For iterative attacks such as PGD and MIM, we set the number of iterations to 40 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST and 10 for CIFAR-10. The step size is determined as divided by the iteration number in each test. All the perturbations are produced for untargeted attacks using l ∞ norm. Fig. 3 shows the adversarial examples. The first two rows are the examples for MNIST on FGSM attack, the next two rows are the examples for Fashion-MNIST on PGD attack, and the last two rows are the examples for CIFAR-10 on MIM attack with different strengths of the attacks.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the classification performance of the proposed algorithm on adversarial robustness, by comparing with two state-of-the-arts defense methods [8] , [40] . The two studies are chosen as they have two comparable aspects, i.e., random target encoding and ensemble, to the proposed algorithm. Saito and Roy [8] proposed to use random target encoding, yet the binary codeword are selected once at the beginning without any regulations unlike the proposed algorithm. Moreover, they do not use the ensemble. Pang et al. [40] adopted an ensemble model and a regularizer to increase the diversity among individual networks, yet they keep the one-hot coding. The code length is set to 64 for the generation of binary codebooks. The size of ensemble is set to 3 in the experiments. We set the same number of networks in ensemble for both the proposed algorithm and Pang's work for fair comparisons. Table 1 shows the classification performance of the tested algorithms. As shown, the proposed algorithm significantly outperforms the compared algorithms in most of the experiments. The proposed algorithm provides 97.2%, 51.3%, and 63.8% on the average of all the attacks in MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10, respectively. As compared, Saito et al. and Pang et al. provide 96 .1% and 67.2%, 38.0% and 23.7%, and 58.2% and 32.4% on the average in MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10, respectively. It is also highlighted that the proposed algorithm is more robust when comparing the differences between clean images and attack images. In other words, the gaps between clean and adversarial images are relatively smaller than those in the compared algorithms. For instance, the proposed algorithm yields 92.1 % in Fashion-MNIST, and the performance 
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM 1) PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON CODE LENGTH
We examine the performance change when choosing different lengths of codewords. Table 2 shows the performance comparisons when choosing 9, 16, 32, 64, and 128 on clean examples and FGSM adversarial examples. The smallest possible code length is 9 according to Eq. 2. The classification performance tends to increase with the number of code lengths in the both examples because the Hamming distance also increases. The performance is saturated when the code length reaches to 64. We chose to employ code length 64 to test our ensemble algorithm for efficiency.
2) PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON ENSEMBLE
We evaluate the performance with respect to the size of ensemble on the adversarial attacks, using MNIST and Fashion-MNIST dataset. To this aim, we assess classification VOLUME 7, 2019 accuracies on clean examples and FGSM, PGD, and MIM adversarial examples with increasing the number of classifiers. We tested with 3,5, and 7 classifiers in ensemble as compared to the single classifier as a baseline. Fig. 4 shows the classification accuracies with respect to the different sizes of the ensemble. The baseline is depicted with one in the number of classifiers in ensemble in Fig. 4 . As shown, the accuracies on clean examples slightly increase in ensemble. As compared, however, the adversarial accuracy is fairly improved in most experiments when the size grows from 1 to 5. For instance, when FGSM attacks are applied, the accuracies increase from 95.0% to 97.3% in MNIST and from 36.2% to 49.4% in Fashion-MNIST. We found similar results to the other attack scenarios. In the ensemble of 7 classifiers, the performance is dropped on malign data. This result can be explained with the correlation in binary code books assigned in the ensemble. In other words, as the number of codebook increases, there could be more chances that the same binary code or the flipped code can be assigned for different labels in different classifiers. As the classifiers are simultaneously backpropagated with single objective function, attackers would still utilize the gradient of the function and correlation between codes to confuse the classes. This problem might not affect the performance on clean examples because the classifiers will be optimized to decrease the gradient of the same objective function regardless of their correlation in labeling.
3) PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON RANDOM BINARY CODES
We carry out experiments to evaluate the performance when using the single random binary codebook (SRBC) and multiple random binary codebooks (MRBC). More specifically, the SRBC represents a scenario that all the CNNs in an ensemble use the same codebook for the target encoding. On the contrary, the MRBC represent the way of the proposed method, using different and independent codebooks for the CNNs. Table 3 shows the performance comparisons when applying FGSM, PGD, and MIM attacks to the databases. The performance of the MRBC is comparable in MNIST dataset. However, the performance is significantly better than that of the SRBC in Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10. The average accuracies of the MRBC in Fashion-MNIST and in CIFAR-10 are 38.6% and 55.7%, respectively. However, the accuracies of the SRBC are much degraded, i.e., 33.1% and 30.8% in Fashion-MNIST and in CIFAR-10, respectively.
It is also known that the adversarial attack is more critical when there are less number of training samples. Thus, we conduct an experiment to verify that the proposed algorithm using independent random codes promotes the robustness upon limited supervision. The assumption is based upon that the distinctive binary code assigned to each classifier in ensemble would take an advantage in training. Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain a sufficient number of high quality data in practical. To examine this aspect, we tested the performance when using 1/2 and 1/4 ratio number of data samples that are randomly extracted from the original training set and observed the result in different number of provided data.
As shown in Table 4 , the ensemble of multiple random binary codes shows better performance than that of a single random binary code. Especially, when using the MRBC in CIFAR-10, the accuracy is 40.2% and 28.7%, respectively using the 1/2 and 1/4 ratios of training samples. However, the performance is significantly decreased to 15.6% and 13.3%, respectively. This result validates that training ensemble with various binary code labels for an input can foster an internal data augmentation by increasing the chances to capture uncorrelated features per individual codes, and support our algorithm to stay robust under adversarial attacks by better generalization in the circumstance of insufficient data.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the fragility of current CNNs against adversarial attacks. We proposed to enhance their resistance to these attacks by ensemble of random binary codebooks for each classifier. This algorithm can be easily applied to any kind of CNNs with a little modifications in its architecture. From the experiment, we observed that employing various binary encodings per an input flourish the outcome of the classifiers in an ensemble. The ensemble is made with the same learning architecture but different network parameters, which entails the enhancement of CNN robustness to adversarial attacks. On top of that, these distinguished binary codes in ensemble played the role of boosting data prosperity by allowing the CNN to acquire diverse features from input images, which enabled our algorithm to maintain its robustness even under the reduced number of data.
